Free-riding on Liquidity by Berentsen, Aleksander et al.
Free-riding on Liquidity
Aleksander Berentsen
University of Basel and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Samuel Huber
University of Basel
Alessandro Marchesiani
University of Minho
September 30, 2011
Abstract
Do financial market participants free-ride on liquidity? To address this
question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents
face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks. A secondary financial
market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets
in response to these shocks. The opportunity to do so reduces the demand
for the liquid asset and, hence, its value. The optimal policy response is
to restrict (but not eliminate) access to the secondary financial market.
The reason for this result is that the portfolio choice exhibits a pecuniary
externality: An agent does not take into account that by holding more
of the liquid asset, he not only acquires additional insurance but also
marginally increases the value of the liquid asset which improves insurance
to other market participants.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses a basic, yet unresolved, question: Do financial market
participants free-ride on liquidity? This question has emerged as one of the
key issues in the policy discussion regrading the unprecedented freeze of money
markets during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. One of the criticism was
that many financial intermediaries became highly dependent on the availability
of short-term instruments to finance their operations. In this paper, we show
that free-riding on liquidity is indeed a problem even in the absence of aggregate
shocks to the economy. Moreover, it can be so strong that the optimal policy
response is to restrict access to facilities that provide short-term financing.
We derive this result in a dynamic general equilibrium model with two nomi-
nal assets: a liquid asset and an illiquid asset.1 By liquid (illiquid), we mean that
1Our basic framework is the divisible money model developed in Lagos and Wright (2005).
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the asset can be used (cannot be used) as a medium of exchange in goods market
trades. Agents face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks which gen-
erate an ex-post inefficiency in that some agents have "idle" liquidity holdings,
while others are liquidity constrained in the goods market. This inefficiency
generates an endogenous role for a secondary financial market where agents can
trade the liquid for the illiquid asset before trading in the goods market. We
show that restricting (but not eliminating) access to this secondary financial
market can be welfare improving.
The basic mechanism for this result is as follows. In the absence of the sec-
ondary financial market, the demand for the liquid asset is high, since agents
need to self-insure against the idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks.
The aggregate demand for the liquid asset depends on the distribution of the
liquidity risk and the cost of self-insurance. With the secondary financial mar-
ket, they attempt to allocate a larger fraction of their wealth to the higher
yielding illiquid asset. This reduces the demand for the liquid asset, and so its
equilibrium price falls. This can reduce aggregate activity, and the effect can
be so strong that it dominates the benefits provided by the secondary financial
market in reallocating liquidity.
In a sense made precise in the present paper, the secondary financial market
allows market participants to free-ride on the liquidity holdings of other partic-
ipants. An agent does not take into account that by holding more of the liquid
asset he not only acquires additional insurance against his own idiosyncratic
liquidity risks, but also marginally increases the value of the liquid asset which
improves insurance to other market participants. This pecuniary externality
can be corrected by restricting, but not eliminating, access to the secondary
financial market.
1.1 Liquidity
There are many competing definitions of liquidity. In our model, liquidity mea-
sures the ease of converting an asset into consumption. An asset that can be
directly exchanged for consumption goods is called liquid. In our model, the
liquid asset is fiat money and the illiquid asset is a one-period government bond.
The former can be used as a medium of exchange to acquire consumption goods,
while the latter cannot be used. Nevertheless, government bonds obtain a liq-
The main departure from this framework is that we add government bonds and a secondary
bond market, and that we assume that all markets are perfectly competitive.
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uidity premium, since they can be exchanged for fiat money in the secondary
financial market, and the money can then subsequently be used to acquire con-
sumption goods.
The fact that government bonds cannot be used as a medium of exchange
to acquire consumption goods is the consequence of certain assumptions that
we impose on our environment as explained in the main discourse of this paper.
Note, though, that government bonds are only essential if they are illiquid.2
That is, if agents can use government bonds as a medium of exchange in the
goods market, the resulting allocation would be identical to the one obtained in
an economy without government bonds. The intuition for this result is provided
in Kocherlakota (2003, p. 184): "If bonds are as liquid as money, then people
will only hold money if nominal interest rates are zero. But then the bonds can
just be replaced by money: there is no difference between the two instruments at
all." An interesting implication of this result is that "any essentiality of nominal
bonds can be traced directly to their (relative) illiquidity (Kocherlakota 2003,
p. 184)."3
1.2 Literature
During the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, liquidity (markets that provide
short-term financing) dried up dramatically. This phenomenon sparked a re-
newed interest by policy makers. However, liquidity shortages and liquidity
crises have been studied intensively in the literature. Most of these papers
share elements of the seminal contribution by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Our paper differs from this literature in several dimensions. First, our model
is not a model of crisis: there are neither aggregate shocks nor multiple equi-
libria. Liquidity shortages and free-riding on liquidity occur in "normal" times;
i.e., in the unique steady state equilibrium. Second, we propose a novel policy
response by showing that restricting access to secondary financial markets can
be optimal. Third, to our knowledge our paper is the only attempt to study
free-riding on liquidity in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The infinite
horizon allows us to determine endogenously the value of money, which is an
2By essential, we mean that illiquid government bonds improve the real allocation in the
model.
3Alternatively, if nominal bonds are liquid and pay a strictly positive nominal interest rate,
then the real value of fiat money must be zero. But since interest on nominal bonds is paid
out in units of fiat money, the real value of the interest on bonds is zero as well. It then
follows that nominal bonds can never be sold at a discount, so a zero nominal interest rate is
the only equilibrium.
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intrinsically useless object and, so, can have no value in a deterministic model
with a finite time horizon.
Real assets and finite time horizon models4 Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
study an economy where depositors are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
which are private information. They show that deposit contracts are subject
to a coordination problem which may lead to banking panics. Given their as-
sumptions of first-come, first-served and costly liquidation, if depositors believe
that other depositors will withdraw money from the bank, they may decide to
also make early withdrawals which then leads to a liquidity crisis. Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) show that a pre-commitment policy, in the form of "suspension
of convertibility", leads to a Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium.
Building on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)
develop a model of an inter-bank market. The inter-bank market creates a free-
riding problem: banks tend to underinvest in liquid assets since they know they
can meet their liquidity needs on the inter-bank market. They show that an
optimal insurance contract, in the form of central bank reserve requirements,
can be welfare improving.
Diamond and Rajan (2005) study whether bank failures can cause a shortage
of liquidity in an economy with real contracts. They show that if too many
projects are delayed, the bank may run short of liquidity. This may lead the
bank to call loans, forcing a costly restructuring of investments, which may lead
to runs on other banks, even if depositors are optimistic.5
Nominal assets and finite time horizon models Holmström and Tirole
(1998) study the role of government provision of liquidity in a model with idio-
syncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks. Without aggregate uncertainty, there
is no need for government intervention. The optimal allocation can be achieved
by financial intermediaries that offer credit lines. With aggregate uncertainty,
the private sector cannot attain the constrained-efficient allocation, because each
firm needs liquidity exactly when all the other firms need it too. In this case,
government provision of liquidity is Pareto-improving.
4The following literature review is in no way complete. The literature that followed the
seminal contribution by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is simply too large for a comprehensive
review.
5Diamond and Rajan (2006) extend Diamond and Rajan (2005) to nominal contracts.
While this extension is useful to understand the relation between variables like prices, money,
and real production, it does not affect the main findings of Diamond and Rajan (2005).
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Allen and Gale (1998) argue that bank runs are related to business cycles
rather than random events. During an economic downturn, the value of bank
assets decreases, which makes it difficult for banks to meet their obligations.
Anticipating this, depositors withdraw money, which worsens the banks liquidity
problem and accelerates the crisis. They study the optimal central bank policy
during panics. In some cases, a laissez-faire central bank which does not respond
to crisis is efficient. In other cases, central bank intervention is optimal.
In Cao and Illing (2010a), banks choose how much they invest in lower
yielding liquid projects and higher yielding illiquid projects. Because of an
inter-bank market, banks have an incentive to free-ride on the liquidity holdings
of other banks, which results in excessive investments in illiquid projects. In the
following period, impatient investors run the bank if they learn that the bank’s
liquidity is not sufficient to cover their claims. Borrowing from this setup,
Cao and Illing (2010b) study the optimal policy response in this framework.
They show that ex-ante liquidity requirements combined with an ex-post lender
of last resort policy attains the highest payoffs for investors. This is because
the former policy response prevents banks from free-riding, whereas the latter
prevents bank runs in the presence of aggregate shocks.
Infinite time horizon models with nominal assets An exception to the
above finite time horizon models is Rojas-Breu (2010). In Rojas-Breu (2010),
some agents use credit cards and some fiat money to acquire consumption goods.
She shows that restricting the use of credit cards can be welfare improving. The
intuition for this result is that marginally increasing the fraction of agents that
use credit cards can have a general equilibrium effect on the price level, which
makes the agents that have no credit card worse off. This effect can be so
strong that overall welfare decreases. In contrast to our model, in her model
restricting the use of credit cards is a local optimum only, since it would be
optimal to endow all agents with credit cards.
2 The Model
Time is discrete, and in each period there are three perfectly competitive mar-
kets which open sequentially.6 The first market is a secondary bond market
6Our basic framework is the divisible money model developed in Lagos and Wright (2005).
This model is useful, because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous preferences while still
keeping the distribution of asset holdings analytically tractable. The main departure from
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where agents trade money for bonds. The second market is a goods market
where agents produce or consume market-2 goods. The third market is the
settlement market where all agents consume and produce market-3 goods. All
goods are nonstorable, which means that they cannot be carried from one mar-
ket to the next.
There is a [0 1] continuum of infinitely lived agents. At the beginning of
each period, agents receive two idiosyncratic iid shocks: a preference shock and
an entry shock. The preference shock determines whether an agent can produce
or consume in the goods market. With probability 1−  an agent can consume
but not produce, and with probability  he can produce but not consume.
Consumers in market 2 are called buyers, and producers are called sellers. The
entry shock determines whether agents can participate in the secondary bond
market. With probability  they can, and with probability 1−  they cannot.
Agents who participate in the bond market are called active, while agents who
do not are called passive.
In the goods market, buyers get utility  () from consuming  units of the
market-2 goods, where 0 () −00 ()  0, 0 (0) = ∞, and 0 (∞) = 0. Sellers
incur the utility cost () =  from producing  units of market-2 goods.7
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), for tractability, we impose assumptions that
yield a degenerate distribution of portfolios at the beginning of the secondary
bond market. That is, we assume that in the last market all agents can produce
and consume market-3 goods. The production technology is linear such that
 units of time produce  units of goods. The utility of consuming  units of
goods is (), where  0 ()  0,  00 () ≥ 0  0 (0) =∞, and  0 (∞) = 0.
Agents discount between, but not within, periods. The discount factor be-
tween two consecutive periods is  = 1(1 + ) where   0 represents the real
interest rate.
2.1 First-best allocation
The planner treats all agents symmetrically. His optimization problem is
W = max [(1− )()− ] + ()−  (1)
Lagos and Wright (2005) is that we add government bonds and a secondary bond market as
in Berentsen and Waller (2011).
7We assume a linear utility cost for ease of exposition. It is a simple generalization to allow
for a more general convex disutility cost.
6
subject to  ≥  and  ≥ (1− ) . The first inequality is the feasibility
constraint for market-3 goods, and the second inequality is the one for market-2
goods. The first-best allocation satisfies  0(∗) = 1, 0(∗) = 1 ∗ = ∗, and
∗ = −1 (1− ) ∗. These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who
dictates consumption and production.
2.2 Information frictions, money and bonds8
There are two perfectly divisible financial assets: money and one-period, nom-
inal discount bonds. Both are intrinsically useless, since they are neither argu-
ments of any utility function nor are they arguments of any production function.
Both assets are issued by the central bank in the last market. Bonds are payable
to the bearer and default free. One bond pays off one unit of currency in the
last market of the following period.
At the beginning of a period, after the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed,
agents can trade bonds and money in the secondary bond market. The central
bank acts as the intermediary for all bond trades, by recording purchases/sales of
bonds, and redistributing money receipts.9 Since bonds are intangible objects,
they are incapable of being used as a medium of exchange in the goods market,
hence they are illiquid.10 Since agents are anonymous and cannot commit, a
buyer’s promise in market 2 to deliver bonds to a seller in market 3 is not
credible.
To motivate a role for fiat money, search models of money typically impose
three assumptions on the exchange process (Shi 2008): a double coincidence
problem, anonymity, and costly communication. First, our preference struc-
ture creates a single-coincidence problem in the goods market, since buyers do
not have a good desired by sellers. Second, agents in the goods market are
8The description of the environment in this subsection follows very closely Berentsen and
Waller (2011). However, the question investigated in Berentsen and Waller (2011) are not
related to the questions studied in this paper.
9The central bank is assumed to have a record-keeping technology over bond trades in the
secondary bond market, and bonds are book-keeping entries — no physical object exists. This
implies that agents are not anonymous to the central bank. Nevertheless, despite having a
record-keeping technology over bond trades, the central bank has no record-keeping technology
over goods trades.
10The beneficial role of illiquid bonds has been studied in Kocherlakota (2003). Sun (2007),
Shi (2008), and Berentsen and Waller (2011) also find that it is optimal that bonds are illiquid.
All these papers, including Kocherlakota (2003), assume unrestricted access to secondary
financial markets. One of our contributions to this literature is to show that it is not only
optimal that bonds are illiquid but that one has to go one step further. It can be optimal
to reduce their liquidity even further by restricting participation in the secondary financial
market where these bonds are traded for money.
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anonymous, which rules out trade credit between individual buyers and sellers.
Third, there is no public communication of individual trading outcomes (public
memory), which, in turn, eliminates the use of social punishments in support of
gift-giving equilibria. The combination of these frictions implies that sellers re-
quire immediate compensation from buyers. In short, there must be immediate
settlement with some durable asset, and money is the only such durable asset.
These are the micro-founded frictions that make money essential for trade in
market 2. Araujo (2004), Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), and Aliprantis,
Camera and Puzzello (2007) provide a more detailed discussion of the charac-
teristics that make money essential. In contrast, in the last market all agents
can produce for their own consumption or use money balances acquired earlier.
In this market, money is not essential for trade.11
2.3 Money supply process
Denote  as the per capita money stock and  as the per capita stock of
newly issued bonds at the end of period . Then −1 (−1) is the beginning-
of-period money (bond) stock in period . Let  denote the price of bonds in
market 3. Then, the change in the money stock in period  is given by
 −−1 =  −1 +−1 −  (2)
The change in the money supply at time  is given by three components: a
lump-sum money transfer ( =  −1); the money created to redeem −1
units of bonds; and the money withdrawal from selling  units of bonds at the
price . We assume there are positive initial stocks of money 0 and bonds
0 with 00  1− . For    0, the government must be able to extract money
via lump-sum taxes from the economy.
3 Agent’s decisions
For notational simplicity, the time subscript  is omitted when understood.
Next-period variables are indexed by +1, and previous-period variables are in-
dexed by −1. In what follows, we look at a representative period  and work
backwards, from the settlement to the bond market.
11One can think of agents as being able to barter perfectly in this market. Obviously in
such an environment, money is not needed.
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3.1 Settlement market
In the settlement market, agents can consume and produce market-3 goods.
Furthermore, they receive money for maturing bonds, buy newly issued bonds,
adjust their money balances by trading money for goods, and receive the lump-
sum money transfer  . An agent entering the settlement market with  units
of money and  units of bonds has the indirect utility function 3( ). An
agent’s decision problem in the settlement market is
3( ) = max+1+1 [()− + 1(+1 +1)]  (3)
subject to
+ +1 + +1 = + + +  (4)
The first-order conditions with respect to +1 +1 and  are  0() = 1, and
1
+1 = 
−11
+1 =  (5)
where the term 1+1 (1+1) is the marginal benefit of taking one
additional unit of money (bonds) into the next period, and  () is the marginal
cost of doing so. Due to the quasi-linearity of preferences, the choices of +1
and +1 are independent of  and . It is straightforward to show that all
agents exit the settlement market with the same portfolio of bonds and money.
The envelope conditions are
3
 =
3
 =  (6)
3.2 Goods market
Sellers Let  2 ( ) denote the expected value for a seller who enters the
goods market with  units of money and  units of bonds. The seller’s decision
problem is
 2 ( ) = max [− + 3(+  )] (7)
He receives disutility  from producing  units of market-2 goods and his
continuation value is 3(+  ).
Using (6), the seller’s first order condition is
 = 0 () = 1 (8)
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Condition (8) means that a seller chooses to produce a quantity  such that
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit, 0 () = 1, is equal to the
marginal benefit, . Note that a seller’s decision is independent of his portfolio
( ). This means that the seller’s decision in the goods market is not affected
by the entry shock. In what follows, we therefore assume that all sellers produce
the same quantity  in the goods market.
Buyers Let  2 ( ) denote the expected value for a buyer who enters the
goods market with  units of money and  units of bonds. Let  be the price
of goods in the goods market. His decision problem is
 2 ( ) = max
"
() + 3(−  )
s.t. −  ≥ 0
#
 (9)
He receives utility () from consuming  units of market-2 goods, and his
continuation value is 3(− ). The constraint means that he cannot spend
more money than the amount he has.
Using (6) and (7), a buyer’s first order conditions in market 2 is
0() =  (+ ) (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the buyer’s cash constraint. If the cash
constraint is not binding, then a buyer consumes the efficient quantity of goods.
If the cash constraint is binding, then he spends all his money in goods pur-
chases, and consumption is inefficiently low.
Note that a buyer’s decision depends on his portfolio ( ), since  enters
his cash constraint. Furthermore, in equilibrium, an active buyer will hold more
money than a passive buyer. This means that   ˆ, where the “ˆ” indicates
that the buyer had access to the secondary bond market. It then follows that
ˆ  .
Apply the envelope theorem to (7) and (9) to get the marginal values of
bonds and the marginal values of money for buyers and sellers at the beginning
of the second market:
 2
 =
0()
 
 2
 =
 2
 =
 2
 =  (11)
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3.3 Secondary bond market
Let
³
ˆ ˆ
´
denote the portfolio of an active agent after trading in the secondary
bond market. Furthermore, let 1( ) denote the expected value for an agent
who enters the secondary bond market with  units of money and  units of
bonds before the idiosyncratic shocks are realized. The value 1( ) satisfies12
1( ) =  (1− ) 1 ( ) +  1 ( )
+(1− ) (1− ) 2 ( ) + (1− ) 2 ( )
where for  =  
 1 ( ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
max
ˆˆ
 2 (ˆ ˆ)
s.t. +  ≥ ˆ+ ˆ
ˆ ≥ 0 ˆ ≥ 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
is the value function of an active buyer ( = ) or an active seller ( = ). Active
agents trade bonds for money in order to maximize their utility subject to the
budget constraint
+  ≥ ˆ+ ˆ (13)
Furthermore, there are two short-selling constraints: agents cannot sell more
bonds, and they cannot spend more money, than the amount they carry from
the previous period that is
ˆ ≥ 0 ˆ ≥ 0 (14)
The Lagrange multiplier on (13) is denoted by  , while  and  are the
Lagrange multipliers on (14), where  =   indicates the agent’s type (buyer
or seller). The bond market first-order conditions for an active agent are
 2
ˆ = 
 −  and (15)
 2
ˆ = 
 −  (16)
12Passive buyers and passive sellers cannot change their portfolios and so their value func-
tions at the beginning of the bond market are  2 ( ) and  2 ( ), respectively.
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The envelope conditions in the secondary bond market are
1
 = 
h
(1− ) + 
i
+ (1− )
∙
(1− ) 

2
 + 
 2

¸
 (17)
1
 = 
h
(1− ) + 
i
+ (1− )
∙
(1− ) 

2
 + 
 2

¸
 (18)
4 Stationary monetary equilibria
We focus on symmetric, stationary monetary equilibria, where all agents follow
identical strategies and where real variables are constant over time. Let  ≡
−1 be the gross growth rate of bonds, and let  ≡ −1 be the gross
growth rate of the money supply. These definitions allow us to write (2) as
 − 1−  = −1−1 (1− )  (19)
In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the real stock of money must be constant;
i.e.,  = +1+1 implying that  = +1. Furthermore, the real amount
of bonds must be constant; i.e.,  = −1−1. This implies  = , which we
can use to rewrite (19) as
 − 1−  = 00 (1− )  (20)
Furthermore, in any equilibrium the market clearing condition for market 2 is
(1− ) [ˆ + (1− )] =  (21)
A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such
that: the first order conditions (8) and (10), envelope conditions (11), and clear-
ing condition (21) in the goods market are satisfied; the first order conditions
(5) and envelope conditions (6) in the settlement market hold; the first order
conditions (15)-(16) and the envelope conditions (17)-(18) in the bond market
are satisfied; the government budget constraint (20) holds; real variables are
constant over time, and agent’s decisions are symmetric.
The model has three types of equilibria. In the type I equilibrium, consump-
tion is inefficient for passive buyers, and it is efficient for active buyers. In the
type II equilibrium, consumption is inefficient for both active and passive buy-
ers, and the constraint on bond holdings of the active buyer is not binding. In
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the type III equilibrium, consumption is inefficient for both active and passive
buyers, and the constraint on bond holdings of the active buyers is binding.
In all these equilibria, a buyer will never spend all his money for bonds in
the secondary bond market, implying that  = 0. Furthermore, a seller will
never spend all his bonds for money in the secondary bond market, implying
that  = 0.
4.1 Type I equilibrium
In the type I equilibrium, consumption is inefficient for passive buyers, and it
is efficient for active buyers (  0 ˆ = 0). The constraint on bond holdings
of an active buyer does not bind, and a seller’s constraint on his cash holdings
does not bind ( =  = 0). Using the goods market envelope conditions and
the bond market first order conditions, it holds that 0(ˆ) = 1 = 1. The bond
market envelope conditions can be written as

 =  + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ] 

 = 1
At this point we can define the equilibrium:
Definition 1 A type I equilibrium is a time-independent path {    ˆ  }
satisfying (20), (21), and
 = 1 (22)

 =  + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ] (23)
 =  (24)
ˆ = 1 (25)
given parameters value { 00  }.
Equation (22) comes from the goods market first order conditions, expres-
sions (23) and (24) come from the settlement market first order conditions. In
the type I equilibrium, an active buyer is not cash constrained in the goods
market (i.e., he consumes the efficient quantity, ˆ = 1); i.e., equation (25) must
hold. The consumed quantity for passive buyers,  comes from (23). The price
of bonds is equal to 1 in the bond market, while it is equal to their fundamental
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value  in the settlement market. The lump sum money transfer,  , comes
from (20), and the produced quantity  is obtained from (21).
In equilibrium I, the secondary bond market return on bonds, 1 − 1, is
zero. It cannot be negative, since otherwise both buyers and sellers want to sell
bonds. It cannot be strictly positive, since, with a positive interest rate, both
active sellers and active buyers would want to buy bonds, and the supply would
be zero.
4.2 Type II equilibrium
In the type II equilibrium, consumption is inefficient for both active and passive
buyers (  0 ˆ  0). The active buyer’s constraint on bond holdings does
not bind ( = 0), and the active seller’s constraint on bond holdings binds
(  0). Active buyers sell bonds for money up to the point where the
marginal benefit of doing so is equal to the marginal cost. Active sellers sell
all their money for bonds. Using the goods market envelope conditions, and
replacing  =  = 0 into the bond market first-order conditions, we obtain
0(ˆ) =   =   =  −   = . Substitutions yield
 = 10(ˆ)  1. The bond market envelope conditions, (17) and (18), can be
written as follows:
1
 = 
∙
(1− ) 1 + 
1

¸
+ (1− ) [(1− )0() + ] 
1
 = 
∙
(1− ) 1 + 
1

¸
+ (1− )
In the type II equilibrium, the following holds.
Lemma 1 In the type II equilibrium,  = ˆ(1− )
Definition 2 A type II equilibrium is a time-independent path {    ˆ  }
satisfying (20), (21), and
1
 = 
0(ˆ) (26)

 = 
1
 + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ]  (27)
 =   (28)
 = ˆ (1− ) (29)
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given parameters value { 00  }.
The interpretations of the equilibrium equations in Definition 2 are similar
to their respective equations in Definition 1. The model can be solved as follows.
Equations (26), (27), (21), and (29) can be used to obtain    and ˆ. The
price of bonds in the settlement market comes from (28), and the lump sum
money transfer from (20).
4.3 Type III equilibrium
In the type III equilibrium, consumption is inefficient for both active and passive
buyers (  0 ˆ  0), the buyer’s bonds constraint binds (  0), and the
seller’s cash constraint binds (  0). Using the envelope conditions in the
goods-market, and replacing  = 0 and  = 0 into the bond market first-
order conditions, one gets 0(ˆ) =   = −  = − 1 = 
Using (5), lagged one period, envelope conditions (17) and (18) can be written
as follows:

 = 
∙
(1− )0(ˆ) +  1
¸
+ (1− ) [(1− )0() + ] (30)

 =

−1
∙
(1− )0(ˆ) + 
¸
+
1− 
−1  (31)
All variables in (30) are constant. From (31),  must be constant too, and so
the second equation can be written as follows:
 =  {1 +  (1− ) [
0(ˆ)− 1]} 
The price of bonds in the settlement market  includes two components: the
fundamental value of bonds and the liquidity premium which is proportional
to the access probability . In the type III equilibrium, the buyer’s constraint
on bond holdings is binding, thus bonds help to relax the active buyer’s cash
constraint in the goods market. When  = 0, bonds are illiquid in the sec-
ondary bond market, and the liquidity premium is zero. When  = 1, they
are perfectly liquid in the secondary bond market, and the liquidity premium
is  (1− ) [0(ˆ)− 1] . For intermediate values 0    1, the liquidity
premium is in the interval [0  (1− ) [0(ˆ)− 1] ].
There is no liquidity premium in equilibria I and II, since an active buyer’s
constraint on bond holdings is not binding. Consequently, bringing one ad-
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ditional unit of bonds into the bond market does not help to relax the cash
constraint in the goods market, and so there is no liquidity premium on bonds.
Lemma 1 still holds in the type III equilibrium. In addition, the following
Lemma holds.
Lemma 2 In the type III equilibrium, 00 =

(1−) .
Definition 3 A type III equilibrium is a time-independent path {    ˆ  }
satisfying (20), (21), and
0
0 =

 (1− ) (32)

 = 
∙
(1− )0(ˆ) +  1
¸
+ (1− ) [(1− )0() + ] (33)
 =  {1 +  (1− ) [
0(ˆ)− 1]} (34)
 = ˆ(1− ) (35)
given parameters value { 00  }.
In Definition (3),  is obtained from Lemma 2. In contrast, in Definitions
(1) and (2) it was obtained from the goods-market first order conditions (26)
and (22), respectively. All the other equations in Definition 3 have the same
interpretation of the respective equations in Definition 2.
The problem can be solved as follows. Use (32) to get . Then solve equa-
tions (33), (21) and (35) for ,  and ˆ. Finally, solve (34) for  and (20) for
 
4.4 Regions of equilibria
In the following Lemma we characterize three non-overlapping regions in which
these different types of equilibria exist.
Lemma 3 There exist critical values  and  , with  ≤  ≤   ∞,
such that the following is true: if  ≤   , an active buyer consumes the
efficient quantity of goods and his constraint on bond holdings does not bind; if
 ≤    , he consumes the inefficient quantity of goods and his constraint
on bond holdings does not bind; if  ≤ , he consumes the inefficient quantity
of goods and his constraint on bond holdings binds. The bond prices  and 
16
satisfy:
 = 1  =  if  ≤   
 = 10(ˆ)  =  if  ≤    
 = 00 1−   =  {1 +  (1− ) [0(ˆ)− 1]}  if  ≤ 
The critical values are
 = 
½
 + (1− )
∙
(1− )0( 1
1− )
−1 + 
¸¾
 and
 = 
½
 + (1− )
∙
(1− )
 
0(
1
1− )
−1 + 
¸¾

where 1 =
1−

00 .
In the type I and II equilibria ( ≤   ), the constraint on bond holdings
of active buyers does not bind in the secondary bond market. This implies that
the return on bonds in the secondary bond market, 1, has to be equal to the
return on money, 0(ˆ), and the price of bonds in the settlement market, , must
equal the fundamental value of bonds. The economics underlying this result are
straightforward. Since active agents do not sell all their bonds for money in the
secondary bond market, bonds have no liquidity premium, for any  ≤    ,
and the Fisher equation holds.13
In contrast, in the type III equilibrium ( ≤ ), the constraint on bond
holdings of active buyers binds in the secondary bond market. Consequently,
bonds attain a liquidity premium, and the Fisher equation does not hold; i.e.,
1  .
Figure 1 graphically characterizes the bond prices,  and , as a function of 
in the three types of equilibria. The price of bonds in the secondary bond market
() is constant and equal to 1 in the type I equilibrium (the region between 
and ); it is decreasing in the type II equilibrium (the region between  and
); and it is constant in the type III equilibrium (the region between  and
∞). The price of bonds in the settlement market () follows a different pattern.
In the type I and type II equilibrium, it is equal to the fundamental value of
bonds (), whereas in the type III equilibrium it contains a liquidity premium.
The higher  in the type III equilibrium is, the larger is the difference between
 and .
13The Fisher equation requires that 1 = .
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Figure 1: Bond prices when   1.
Why is there a positive spread −  if   1? If   1, the price  reflects
the fact that the bond can be traded with probability  in the secondary bond
market. In contrast, the price  reflects the fact that the bond can be traded
with probability 1, since the agent has access to the secondary bond market.
Thus, the positive spread is because the bond in the secondary bond market
has a higher liquidity premium than the bond in the settlement market. Note
that the spread vanishes as  → 1. In this case,  =  in all equilibria.
5 Free-riding on liquidity
In this section, we make precise what we mean by the notion of free-riding
on liquidity. First, we show that if agents have a choice to participate in the
secondary bond market, they strictly prefer to do so. Second, we show that
such a participation choice involves a negative pecuniary externality that is not
internalized by market participants. Third, we show that a policy of restricting
access to the secondary bond market can be welfare improving.
5.1 Endogenous participation
So far, we have assumed that participation in the bond market is determined by
the exogenous idiosyncratic participation shock . Suppose instead that each
agent has a choice. Recall that  1 ( ) is the expected lifetime utility of a
buyer at the beginning of the secondary bond market, and  2 ( ) is expected
expected lifetime utility of a buyer at the beginning of the good market who
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had no access to the secondary bond market. Then, for a buyer, it is optimal
to participate if
 1 ( ) ≥  2 ( )
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium,  1 ( )−  2 ( )  0.
According to Lemma 4, a buyer is always better off participating in the
secondary bond market.
To develop an intuition for this result, note that, as shown in the proof of
Lemma 4,
 1 ( )−  2 ( ) =  (ˆ)− ˆ − [ ()− ]−  (ˆ − )  (36)
where  = (1− )  is the nominal interest rate. A passive agent’s period
surplus is  ()−. He acquires  units of consumption goods which yields utility
 (). Since he pays with money, the decrease in his money holdings reduces
future expected consumption, which in terms of utility is valued −. An active
buyer’s surplus is  (ˆ)− ˆ− (ˆ − ). He acquires ˆ units of consumption goods,
which yields utility  (ˆ). The decrease in his money holdings reduces future
expected consumption, which in terms of utility is valued −ˆ. The term  (ˆ − )
measures the utility cost of selling bonds to finance the difference ˆ −   0.
The term  (ˆ)− ˆ− [ ()− ] is strictly positive, while the term − (ˆ − )
is negative. Thus, the equilibrium interest rate cannot be too large in order for
(36) to be positive. In the proof of Lemma 4 we replace  in (36) for all all three
equilibria type and find that  1 ( )−  2 ( )  0.
For the sellers, we also find that it is optimal to participate in the secondary
bond market.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium,  1 ( )−  2 ( ) ≥ 0.
In the type I equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is  = 0. In this case,
 1 ( ) =  2 ( ). In the type II and type III equilibria, the nominal interest
rate is   0 In this case, the seller strictly prefers to enter, since  1 ( ) 
 2 ( ).
5.2 Optimal secondary bond market participation
Lemmas 4 and 5 show that if agents have a choice, they will participate in
the secondary bond market. In the following section, we show that restricting
participation to the bond market can be welfare improving.
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In this section, we show that restricting participation to the secondary bond
market can be welfare improving. The reason is straightforward. The secondary
bond market provides insurance against the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. At
the end of a period in the settlement market, agents choose a portfolio of bonds
and money. At this point, they do not know yet whether they will be buyers
or sellers in the following period. At the beginning of the following period, this
information is revealed, and they can use the secondary bond market to readjust
their portfolio of liquid (money) and illiquid (bonds) assets.
From a welfare point of view, the benefit of the secondary bond market is
that it allocates liquidity to the buyers and allows sellers to earn interest on their
idle money holdings. The drawback of this opportunity is that the secondary
bond market reduces the incentive to self-insure against the liquidity shocks.
This lowers the demand for money in the settlement market, which depresses
its value. This effect can be so strong that it can be optimal to restrict access
to the secondary bond market. The basic mechanism can be seen from the
following welfare calculations.
The welfare function can be written as follows
(1− )W = (1− ) { [(ˆ)− ˆ] + (1− ) [()− ]}+ (∗)− ∗ (37)
where the term in the curly brackets is an agent’s expected period utility in
the goods market, and (∗)−∗ is the agent’s period utility in the settlement
market.
Differentiating (37) with respect to  yields
1− 
1− 
W
 = [(ˆ)− ˆ]− [()− ]
+ [0(ˆ)− 1] ˆ + (1− ) [
0()− 1]  
The contribution of the first two terms to the change in welfare is always positive,
since in any equilibrium ˆ ≥  (with strict inequality for   ). However,
the derivatives ˆ and

 can be negative, reflecting the fact that increasing
participation reduces the incentive to self-insure against idiosyncratic liquidity
risk.14 Reducing the incentive to self-insure reduces the demand for money and
hence its value, which then reduces the consumption quantities  and ˆ.
14We have derived a sufficient condition for ˆ ,   0 for the isoelastic utility function
 () = (1− )−1 1−. The sufficient condition is that  ≥ 1.
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Whether restricting participation is welfare improving or not depends on
which of the two effects dominates. One can show that in the type I and in
the type II equilibria it is always optimal to set  = 1. In contrast, restricting
participation in the type III equilibrium can be welfare improving. Whether
it has this effect depends on preferences and technology. In the following, we
restrict our attention to a case where we can derive analytical results. That is,
from now on we assume the functional forms () = ln ().
Proposition 1 If   ¯, where ¯ is defined in the proof, it is optimal to choose
0    1.
Proposition 1 contains our key result. In the type III equilibrium, it is
optimal to restrict participation in the secondary bond market if the rate of
inflation is sufficiently large. We have constructed "reasonable" numerical ex-
amples, where the economy is in the type III equilibrium and the critical value
¯ is such that at two percent inflation, it is optimal to restrict access to the
secondary bond market.
6 Conclusion
We constructed a general equilibrium model with a liquid and an illiquid asset
where financial market participants free-ride on each other’s liquidity holdings
in the unique steady state equilibrium. The free-riding problem depresses the
value of the liquid asset; however, by restricting access to the secondary asset
market this inefficiency can be reduced.
An agent’s choice of his portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets involves a
pecuniary externality. An agent who increases his demand for the liquid asset
not only acquires insurance against his own idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, but
also affects positively the equilibrium price of this asset. This has a positive
spill-over effect for all other agents in the economy.
Our results may have important policy implications. It is often argued that
while measures to prevent liquidity shortages improve the resilience of the fi-
nancial system to aggregate shocks, they reduce the efficiency of the financial
system in normal times. Our analysis, however, shows that such a trade-off may
not exist, since a policy that increases the demand for the liquid asset can also
improve efficiency in normal times.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In the type II equilibrium, all buyers are cash constrained
in the goods market. Consequently,  =  and ˆ = ˆ hold. The last two
equations imply  = ˆˆ Each active buyer exits the secondary bond market
with ˆ units of money, while an active seller exits with zero units of money.
A passive agent (a seller or a buyer) exits the secondary bond market with 
units of money, therefore −1 = ˆ(1 − ) + 0 ∗  +  (1− ). Replacing
 = −1, we get ˆ = −1(1 − ) Use ˆ = −1(1− ) and  = −1 to
replace ˆ and  into  = ˆˆ, respectively, and get  = ˆ(1− ).
Proof of Lemma 2. Any active agent enters the secondary bond market
with a real portfolio  +  of money and bonds. As a buyer, he sells all
his bonds in a the type III equilibrium, and thus he exits the secondary bond
market with a portfolio ˆ As a seller, he sells all his money thus exits this
market with a portfolio ˆ. Therefore  +  = ˆ holds for an active
buyer, and  +  = ˆ holds for an active seller. Combining the two
equations it holds that
ˆ = ˆ (38)
Immediately after the secondary bond market closes, but before the goods mar-
ket opens, the stock of money in circulation is in the hands of active buyers and
passive agents (sellers and buyers). Active sellers hold no money at the end of
the secondary bond market. Consequently,−1 = (1−)ˆ+∗0+(1−)
Eliminate , using  =−1, and rearrange to get
ˆ = −1
1−  (39)
The stock of bonds in circulation is in the hands of active sellers and passive
agents (sellers and buyers), while active buyers hold no bonds at the end of the
secondary bond market. Thus, the stock of bonds is equal to −1 =  (1− ) ∗
0 + ˆ + (1 − ) Since passive agents do not trade in the secondary bond
market, they enter the goods market with the same amount of bonds they had
at the beginning of the period,  = −1 Use this equation to eliminate  in the
bond stock expression above and get
ˆ = −1  (40)
Replace ˆ and ˆ in (38) using (39) and (40), respectively. Since the bonds-to-
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money ratio is constant over time, we can replace the time − 1 stock of money
and bonds with their respective initial values.
Proof of Lemma 3. Derivation of . The critical value  is the value of
 such that expressions (27) and (23) hold simultaneously. For easy of reference,
we rewrite the two equations below:

 = 
0(

1− ) + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ] 

 =  + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ] 
The two expressions above are equal if 0( 1−) = 1. Noting that 0( 1−) =
0()0( 11−), we can replace 0() in the second equation to get
 = 
½
 + (1− )
∙
(1− )0( 1
1−  )
−1 + 
¸¾

Derivation of . The critical value  is the value of  such that equa-
tions (33) and (27) hold simultaneously. For easy of reference, we rewrite the
two equations below:

 = 
∙
(1− )0( 
1−  ) + 
1

¸
+ (1− ) [(1− )0() + ] 

 = 
0(

1− ) + (1− ) [(1− )
0() + ] 
The two expressions above are equal if 0( 1−) = 1 . Noting that 0( 1−) =
0()0( 11−), we have 0()0( 11−) = 1 . Replace 0() in the second equation
to get

 = 
1
 + (1− )
"
(1− ) 10( 11−)
+ 
#

Proof of Lemma 4. From the buyer’s problem in the secondary bond market,
 1 ( ) =  2 (ˆ ˆ), where ˆ and ˆ are the quantities of money and bonds that
maximize  2 . In any equilibrium, the buyer’s budget constraint (13) holds with
equality. Thus, we can use (13) to eliminate ˆ from  2 (ˆ ˆ) and get
 1 ( ) =  2
µ
ˆ + − ˆ
¶
(41)
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Next, use (4), (9), and (3), to get
 1 ( ) =  (ˆ) +  ()− − +1 − +1 +  (ˆ− ˆ)
+
∙+ − ˆ

¸
+  + 1 (+1 +1)  (42)
From (2),  =  −−1 +  −−1, and the budget constraint in the goods
market satisfies ˆ = ˆ. Furthermore, all agents exit the period with the same
amount of money and bonds, hence +1 =  and +1 = . Using these
equalities we can rewrite (42) as follows:
 1 ( ) =  (ˆ) +  (∗)− ∗ + − ˆ − + 1 (+1 +1) 
Furthermore,  =  and ˆ = ˆ and so
 1 ( ) =  (ˆ) +  (∗)− ∗ + ˆ +
µ
1− 

¶
 + 1 (+1 +1) 
Another way to write this is
 1 ( ) =  (ˆ)− ˆ +  (∗)− ∗ −  (ˆ − ) + 1 (+1 +1)  (43)
The active buyer’s period surplus is  (ˆ)−ˆ, but he has to pay interest  = 1−1
on the difference ˆ − 
Along the same lines, one can show that
 2 ( ) =  ()−  +  (∗)− ∗ + 1 (+1 +1)  (44)
The difference between (43) and (44) is
 1 ( )−  2 ( ) =  (ˆ)− ˆ − [ ()− ]−  (ˆ − )  (45)
We now need to analyze (45) for the different equilibria. For the type I equilib-
rium,  comes from (22), thus
 1 ( )−  2 ( ) = Ψ1 ≡  (ˆ)− ˆ − [ ()− ]  0
which is clearly strictly positive since ∗  ˆ  .
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For the type II equilibrium,  comes from (26), thus
Ψ2 ≡  (ˆ)− ˆ − [ ()− ]− [0 (ˆ)− 1] (ˆ − )  (46)
For the type III equilibrium,  comes from (32), thus
Ψ3 ≡  (ˆ)− ˆ − [ ()− ]−
µ0
0
1− 
 − 1
¶
(ˆ − ) 
Note that in the type III equilibrium we have 0 (ˆ) ≥ 1 = 00 1− . Accordingly,
Ψ3 ≥ Ψ2. Hence, it is sufficient to show that Ψ2  0. To do so, rewrite (46) as
follows:
 (ˆ)−  ()− ˆ +   [0 (ˆ)− 1] (ˆ − ) 
Divide both sides by ˆ −   0 and simplify to get
 (ˆ)−  ()
ˆ −   
0 (ˆ) .
Since ˆ  , the strict concavity of  implies that the above expression is always
true. Hence, Ψ3 ≥ Ψ2  0.
Proof of Lemma 5. For a seller, it is optimal to participate if
 1 ( ) ≥  2 ( )
In any equilibrium, one can show along the same lines as for the buyers (see the
proof of Lemma 4) that the difference  1 ( )−  2 ( ) satisfies
 1 ( )−  2 ( ) = 
µ
1− 

¶
(ˆ − )  (47)
which is clearly non-negative. Hence, sellers participate as well.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is structured as follows. First, we
calculate the total derivative of the welfare function with respect . Second,
we study the sign of this derivative at  = 1 and show that it is negative for a
sufficiently high . Third, we do the same for  = 0 and show that the derivative
is positive for a sufficiently high .
For our functional forms, welfare satisfies
(1− )W = (1− ) {[ [log(ˆ)− ˆ] + (1− ) [log()− ]]}+(∗)− ∗ (48)
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Next, use (33) to solve for  to get
 = (1− ) (1− )
 −   − (1− )
 (49)
Take the total derivative of (48) with respect to  to get
1− 
1− 
W
 = log
1
1−  − ˆ +  + 
ˆ

1− ˆ
ˆ + (1− )


1− 
  (50)
The derivatives of the consumption quantities are

 =
(1− )
n
(1− )
³

 − 
´
− 
h 
 −   − (1− )
io
h 
 −   − (1− )
i2 and
ˆ
 =
(1− )
³

 − 
´
− 
h 
 −   − (1− )
i
h 
 −   − (1− )
i2 
The next step is to calculate the value of (50) at  = 1, and show that it is
negative for a sufficiently high . Let Φ ≡  −  . After simple substitutions we
get
1− 
1− 
W

¯¯¯¯
=1
= log
1
1−  −
1− 
Φ +
(1− ) (1− )
Φ
+
(1− )
³
1
 − 1
´
− Φ
(1− )Φ −
(1− )
³
1
 − 1
´
− Φ
Φ2
which can be simplified as follows:
1− 
1− 
W

¯¯¯¯
=1
= log
1
1−  −

1−  +

h
1
 − (1− )
i
Φ −
(1− )
³
1
 − 1
´
Φ2 
(51)
The first two terms of the right-hand side, log 11− and−(1−), do not depend
on . In absolute value, they are both increasing in , but the first term increases
slower than the second term, since
 1−
 = 1 (1− )2  1(1−) =  log
1
1−
 for
0   ≤ 1. Therefore, their sum is decreasing in . Since log 11−−(1−) = 0
at  = 0, log 11− − (1− )  0 for any 0   ≤ 1.
In absolute value, the third and fourth term are decreasing in , and their
sum tends to zero as  goes to infinity. Denote the value of  such that W
¯¯
=1 =
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0 by . Then, W
¯¯
=1  0 for any  ≥ . Finally, the type III equilibrium
only exists for    . Hence, both conditions    and    must be
satisfied for   1 to be optimal. However, one can show that    at
 = 1.
We now calculate the value of (50) at  = 0, and show that W is positive
for a sufficiently high  The derivative of the welfare function with respect to
 at  = 0 is
1− 
1− 
W

¯¯¯¯
=0
= log
1
1−  −
1

 − 
+
(1− )

 − 
+

³
1
 − 1
´
− 
³ 
 − 
´

 − 
− (1− )

³
1
 − 1
´
− 
³ 
 − 
´
³ 
 − 
´2
which can be simplified further as
1− 
1− 
W

¯¯¯¯
=0
= log
1
1−  − +

h
1
 − (1 + )
i

 − 
−
(1− )
³
1
 − 1
´
³ 
 − 
´2  (52)
In absolute value, the first and the second terms, log 11− and − are increasing
in , but the first term increases faster than the second term. Therefore, the
difference log 11− −  is increasing in . Since log 11− −  = 0 for  = 0, then
log 11− −   0 for any 0   ≤ 1.
In absolute value, the third and fourth term are both decreasing in  and
they tend to zero as  approaches infinity. Denote the value of  such that
W

¯¯
=0 = 0 by . Then, W
¯¯
=0  0 for any  ≥ . Since the type
III equilibrium only exists for    , it is optimal to set   0 for any
  max© ª.
Combining the second and third part, it is optimal to set 0    1 for any
  ¯ where ¯ ≡ max©  ª.
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